Semi-Automated Reasoning About Non-Determinism in C Expressions

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C quiz

```
int main() {
    int x;
    int y = (x = 3) + (x = 4);
    printf("%d, %d\n", x, y);
}
```

What is the expected outcome of this program ?

C quiz

```
int main() {
    int x;
    int y = (x = 3) + (x = 4);
    printf("%d, %d\n", x, y);
}
```

a small experiment with existing compilers gives

compiler	outcome	warnings
compcert	4, 7	no
clang	4, 7	yes
gcc-4.9	4, 8	no

C quiz

```
int main() {
    int x;
    int y = (x = 3) + (x = 4);
    printf("%d, %d\n", x, y);
}
```

according to C standard, the program is allowed do... anything, it is even allowed to crash

this program violates the sequence point restriction:

- the order of evaluation in C expressions is unspecified
- concurrent memory access is allowed
- multiple unsequenced modifications result in undefined behavior

this talk

the problem: sequence point violations may cause a C program to crash or to have arbitrary results

the goal: guarantee the absence of undefined behavior in a given C program for any evaluation order

in this talk:

- use concurrent separation logic to reason about C (previous work, Krebbers POPL'14)
- (2) turn it into a semi-automated reasoning procedure (our contributions)

(Krebbers POPL'14)

observation: view non-determinism through concurrency **idea**: use the concurrent separation logic

$$\frac{\{P_1\} e_1 \{\Psi_1\} \quad \{P_2\} e_2 \{\Psi_2\} \quad \forall v_1 v_2. \Psi_1 v_1 * \Psi_2 v_2 \vdash \varPhi(w_1 \llbracket \odot \rrbracket w_2)}{\{P_1 * P_2\} e_1 \odot e_2 \{\varPhi\}}$$

using the rules of this logic we can

- split the memory resources into two disjoint parts
- independently prove that each subexpression executes safely

(Krebbers POPL'14)

observation: view non-determinism through concurrency **idea**: use the concurrent separation logic

$$\frac{\{P_1\} e_1 \{\Psi_1\} \quad \{P_2\} e_2 \{\Psi_2\} \quad \forall v_1 v_2. \ \Psi_1 \ v_1 * \Psi_2 \ v_2 \vdash \varPhi(w_1 \llbracket \odot \rrbracket w_2)}{\{P_1 * P_2\} e_1 \odot e_2 \{\varPhi\}}$$

limitations:

- no support for automation
- difficult to conduct even a manual proof in Coq

weakest preconditions

instead of Hoare triples, we model our program logic using weakest precondition calculus

wp e
$$\{ arPsi \}$$

- e is safe (has defined behavior),
- if e terminates with a value v, then v satisfies the predicate arPhi

the non-determinism is reflected in a similar but more concise way:

$$\frac{\mathsf{wp} \mathsf{e}_1 \{\Psi_1\} \quad \mathsf{wp} \mathsf{e}_2 \{\Psi_2\} \quad (\forall \mathsf{w}_1 \mathsf{w}_2. \ \Psi_1 \ \mathsf{w}_1 \ast \Psi_2 \ \mathsf{w}_2 \ \twoheadrightarrow \ \varPhi(\mathsf{w}_1 \ \llbracket \odot \rrbracket \ \mathsf{w}_2))}{\mathsf{wp} \left(\mathsf{e}_1 \ \odot \ \mathsf{e}_2\right) \{\varPhi\}}$$

dereferencing

a possible candidate for the load operation:

$$\frac{\texttt{wp} \texttt{e} \{\texttt{l}. \exists \texttt{w}. \texttt{l} \mapsto \texttt{w} \ast (\texttt{l} \mapsto \texttt{w} \twoheadrightarrow \varPhi \texttt{w})\}}{\texttt{wp} (\texttt{*e}) \{\varPhi\}}$$

dereferencing

a possible candidate for the load operation:

$$\frac{\texttt{wp e} \left\{\texttt{l}. \; \exists \texttt{w}. \; \texttt{l} \mapsto \texttt{w} * (\texttt{l} \mapsto \texttt{w} \twoheadrightarrow \varPhi \texttt{w}) \right\}}{\texttt{wp (*e)} \left\{\varPhi\right\}}$$

too weak: does not allow sharing e.g., *1 + *1

sharing resources

fractional permissions enable sharing of resources:

$$\texttt{l} \xrightarrow{q_1+q_2} \texttt{v} \dashv \vdash \texttt{l} \xrightarrow{q_1} \texttt{v} * \texttt{l} \xrightarrow{q_2} \texttt{v}$$

so multiple subexpressions can safely read from the same location

the rule for load becomes

$$\frac{\mathsf{wp} \mathrel{\mathsf{e}} \left\{ \mathtt{l} . \exists \mathtt{w} \: q . \: \mathtt{l} \stackrel{q}{\mapsto} \mathtt{w} \ast (\mathtt{l} \stackrel{q}{\mapsto} \mathtt{w} \twoheadrightarrow \varPhi \: \mathtt{w}) \right\}}{\mathsf{wp} \: (\mathtt{*e}) \: \{ \varPhi \}}$$

so we can now prove programs like *l + *l

a possible candidate for the assignment operation:

$$\frac{\mathsf{wp} \; \mathsf{e}_1 \left\{ \Psi_1 \right\} \quad \mathsf{wp} \; \mathsf{e}_2 \left\{ \Psi_2 \right\} \quad (\forall \texttt{l} \; \texttt{w}. \; \Psi_1 \; \texttt{l} * \Psi_2 \; \texttt{w} \twoheadrightarrow \exists \texttt{v}. \; \texttt{l} \stackrel{1}{\mapsto} \texttt{v} * (\texttt{l} \stackrel{1}{\mapsto} \texttt{w} \twoheadrightarrow \varPhi \texttt{w}))}{\mathsf{wp} \; (\mathsf{e}_1 = \mathsf{e}_2) \left\{ \varPhi \right\}}$$

a possible candidate for the assignment operation:

$$\frac{\mathsf{wp} \mathsf{e}_1 \{\Psi_1\} \quad \mathsf{wp} \mathsf{e}_2 \{\Psi_2\} \quad (\forall \mathtt{l} \mathtt{w}. \Psi_1 \mathtt{l} \ast \Psi_2 \mathtt{w} \twoheadrightarrow \exists \mathtt{v}. \mathtt{l} \stackrel{1}{\mapsto} \mathtt{v} \ast (\mathtt{l} \stackrel{1}{\mapsto} \mathtt{w} \twoheadrightarrow \varPhi \mathtt{w}))}{\mathsf{wp} (\mathtt{e}_1 = \mathtt{e}_2) \{\varPhi\}}$$

unsound: does not account for sequence point violations for example, we could verify programs like l = (l = 3)

to account for sequence point violations, we decorate fractional permissions with two access levels :

$$1 \stackrel{q}{\mapsto_{\xi}} v$$
, $\xi \in \{L, U\}$

- permission $1 \xrightarrow{q} v$ states that the location is **unlocked**, so one can read from/write to the location 1
- permission $1 \stackrel{q}{\mapsto}_{L} v$ states that the location has been **locked**, someone is already writing to it, so reads/writes are forbidden

the rule for assignment becomes

$$\frac{\mathsf{wp} \, \mathsf{e}_1 \, \{ \Psi_1 \} \quad \mathsf{wp} \, \mathsf{e}_2 \, \{ \Psi_2 \} \quad (\forall \mathtt{l} \, \mathtt{w}. \, \Psi_1 \, \mathtt{l} \ast \Psi_2 \, \mathtt{w} \twoheadrightarrow \exists \mathtt{v}. \, \mathtt{l} \stackrel{1}{\mapsto}_U \mathtt{v} \ast (\mathtt{l} \stackrel{1}{\mapsto}_L \mathtt{w} \twoheadrightarrow \varPhi \mathtt{w}))}{\mathsf{wp} \, (\mathsf{e}_1 = \mathsf{e}_2) \, \{ \varPhi \}}$$

programs like l = (l = 3) cannot be verified any more

unlocking modality

remark: we want to access locked pointers later again

we use the unlocking modality ${\mathbb U}$ that unlocks all locked locations at the sequence point :

$$\frac{\operatorname{wp} e_1 \{ \ldots \mathbb{U}(\operatorname{wp} e_2 \{ \Phi \}) \}}{\operatorname{wp} (e_1; e_2) \{ \Phi \}} \qquad \qquad \frac{1 \stackrel{q}{\mapsto_L} v}{\mathbb{U}(1 \stackrel{q}{\mapsto_U} v)} \qquad \qquad \frac{P \twoheadrightarrow Q}{\mathbb{U}P \twoheadrightarrow \mathbb{U}Q}$$

reasoning about programs

usually we prove programs assuming some logical context:

 ${\it P}\vdash {\sf wp} ~ {\sf e} ~ \{\varPhi\}$

we intertwine the application of wp rules with other logical steps (*splitting resources, discharging side-conditions, ...*)

manual proof quickly becomes tedious even for small programs e.g., to reason about binary operators we have to

- infer manually the intermediate postconditions
- subdivide resources all the time

key idea

turn program logic into an algorithm procedure using a novel symbolic execution algorithm:

input		output
precondition		postcondition
program	>	value
		frame = resources not used



$l \mapsto v1 * k \mapsto v2 * r \mapsto v3$

l = *k + 10

postcondition: \top

frame: T



$l \mapsto v1 * k \mapsto v2 * r \mapsto v3$ l = v2 + 10

 $\begin{array}{lll} \mbox{postcondition:} & k \stackrel{0.5}{\longmapsto} v2 \\ \mbox{frame:} & k \stackrel{0.5}{\longmapsto} v2 \end{array}$



$1 \rightarrow \sqrt{1} * k \rightarrow \sqrt{2} * r \rightarrow \sqrt{3}$ $\sqrt{2} + 10$

postcondition: $k \xrightarrow{0.5} v2 * 1 \mapsto_L (v2 + 10)$ frame: $k \xrightarrow{0.5} v2$

example

$1 \mapsto \nabla I * k \mapsto \nabla 2 * r \mapsto \nabla 3$

v2 + 10

postcondition:k $\stackrel{0.5}{\longmapsto}$ v2 * 1 \mapsto_L (v2 + 10)frame:k $\stackrel{0.5}{\longmapsto}$ v2 * r \mapsto v3

example (continued)

 $l \mapsto v1 * k \mapsto v2 * r \mapsto v3$ (l = *k + 10) + (r = *k + 10)

postcondition: \top

frame: T

after executing the LHS

 $1 \mapsto \forall 1 * k \mapsto \forall 2 * r \mapsto \forall 3$ $(\forall 2 + 10) + (r = *k + 10)$

postcondition:k $\stackrel{0.5}{\longrightarrow}$ v2 * 1 \mapsto_L (v2 + 10)frame:k $\stackrel{0.5}{\longrightarrow}$ v2 * r \mapsto v3

before executing the RHS

 $l \mapsto v1 * k \stackrel{0.5}{\longrightarrow} v2 * r \mapsto v3$ (v2 + 10) + (r = *k + 10)

postcondition: $k \xrightarrow{0.5} v2 * 1 \mapsto_L (v2 + 10)$ frame: $k \xrightarrow{0.5} v2 * r \rightarrow v3$

executing the RHS

$$1 \mapsto \sqrt{1} * k \stackrel{0.5}{\longrightarrow} \sqrt{2} * r \mapsto \sqrt{3}$$
$$(\sqrt{2} + 10) + (r = k + 10)$$

postcondition: $k \xrightarrow{3/4} v2 * 1 \mapsto_L (v2 + 10)$ frame: $k \xrightarrow{1/4} v2 * r \mapsto v3$

final result

$$1 \mapsto \sqrt{1} * k \stackrel{0.5}{\longrightarrow} \sqrt{2} * r \mapsto \sqrt{3}$$
$$(\sqrt{2} + 10) + (\sqrt{2} + 10)$$

postcondition:
$$k \xrightarrow{3/4} v2 * 1 \mapsto_L (v2 + 10) * \mathbf{r} \mapsto_L (v2 + 10)$$
frame: $k \xrightarrow{1/4} v2 * \mathbf{r} \mapsto (v2 \neq 10)$

algorithm

our symbolic execution algorithm is a partial function restricted to symbolic heaps ($m \in$ sheap):

```
forward : (sheap \times expr) \rightarrow (val \times sheap \times sheap)
```

satisfying the following specification:

$$\frac{\text{forward}(m, e) = (\texttt{w}, m_1^o, m_1)}{\llbracket m \rrbracket \vdash \mathsf{wp} \; e \; \{\texttt{v}. \; \texttt{v} = \texttt{w} * \llbracket m_1^o \rrbracket \} * \llbracket m_1 \rrbracket}$$

limitations

symbolic execution helps to make the wp rules algorithmic but the algorithm itself may fail for several reasons:

- the program is not of the right shape
- the precondition is not a symbolic heap
- needed resource is missing in the precondition

to turn the program logic into an automated procedure we integrate the symbolic executor algorithm into a verification condition generator (vcgen)

design an interactive verification condition generator



vcgen automates the proof as long as forward does not fail, and when forward fails,

- vcgen returns to the user a partially solved goal
- from which it can be called back after the user helped out

conclusions

main message:

symbolic execution with frames is a key to enable a semi-automated about non-determinism in C in an interactive theorem prover

other contributions:

- a definitional semantics to a fragment of C in Coq
- soundness proof for symbolic executor and vcgen
- development built on top of the Iris framework

thank you !